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RansomHub

11CVEs
83Techniques
32Tools
3Leak sites

Overview

The group emerged in mid-February 2024 and has already listed several organizations as alleged victims of their attacks, resulting from extortion through encryption and data leaks. The announcement of the sale of the new Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) by RansomHub was published on one of the Russian-origin forums used by cybercrime to advertise malicious services, known as RAMP4U (or RAMP). A user with the nickname and persona of 'koley' announced the affiliate program on February 2, 2024. In the new RaaS announcement, it was mentioned that the money laundering operation of the paid ransoms is the responsibility of the affiliate. This means that all communication and sending of the decryptor to the victim are done through chat. The split of this RaaS would be 90% of the value for the affiliate and 10% for the developer, who in this case would be the persona of Koley. Furthermore, according to the publication, the ransomware payload is written in Golang language, uses the asymmetric algorithm based on x25519, and encryption algorithms AES256, ChaCha20, and xChaCha20, standing out for its speed. The encryption is obfuscated using AST. The payload would support network propagation and encryption of data both in secure and local mode. According to Koley, the ransomware is designed to operate on platforms such as Windows, Linux, and ESXi, as well as other architectures such as ARM and MIPS. As pointed out by the panel and already highlighted by the intelligence team, Koley stated that the panel uses a .onion domain, allowing the affiliate to organize and manage targets and chat rooms, view access logs, automatically respond when offline, and create private blog pages.

What public reporting says

  • First seen in February 2024 and widely judged to be a spin-off of the Knight ransomware (earlier Cyclops), whose source code was offered for sale. It recruited affiliates on the Russian-language RAMP forum and forbids attacks on CIS countries, Cuba, North Korea and China.

Trend Micro · Paubox

Geography: origin and targets

United States of America: 347Canada: 35Brazil: 35United Kingdom: 34Italy: 30Germany: 24Australia: 20Spain: 20India: 19France: 18Japan: 12United Arab Emirates: 12Mexico: 8Belgium: 7Netherlands: 7Saudi Arabia: 7RansomHub · Russian FederationRA

Assessed origin: Russian Federation. Russian-based or Russian-friendly operation: it recruits on the Russian-language RAMP forum and forbids attacks on CIS countries. Attribution is uncertain: read it as an assessment, not proof.

  1. United States of America347
  2. Canada35
  3. Brazil35
  4. United Kingdom34
  5. Italy30
  6. Germany24
  7. Australia20
  8. Spain20
  9. India19
  10. France18

Exploited vulnerabilities

VendorProductCVECategorySource
ApacheActiveMQCVE-2023-46604Applicationscisa.gov
AtlassianConfluence Data Center & ServerCVE-2023-22515Applicationscisa.gov
VeeamBackup & ReplicationCVE-2023-27532Applicationslabs.withsecure.com, blogs.blackberry.com, welivesecurity.com, sophos.com, news.sophos.com, security.com, group-ib.com
WindowsCLFSCVE-2022-24521Microsoftsecurelist.com, microsoft.com, security.com
WindowsNetLogonCVE-2020-1472Microsoftcisa.gov, cisa.gov, cisa.gov, cisa.gov, cisa.gov, thedfirreport.com, thedfirreport.com, cisa.gov, cisa.gov, welivesecurity.com, cisa.gov, thedfirreport.com, checkpoint.com
WindowsBITSCVE-2020-0787Microsoftcisa.gov
MS Server ProductsSMBv1CVE-2017-0144Microsoftsentinelone.com, cisa.gov, welivesecurity.com, cisa.gov, kelacyber.com
FortinetFortiOS SSL-VPN & FortiProxyCVE-2023-27997Network edgecisa.gov
FortinetFortiClientEMSCVE-2023-48788Network edgecisa.gov, cisa.gov
F5BIG-IPCVE-2023-46747Network edgecisa.gov
CitrixNetScaler ADC & GatewayCVE-2023-3519Virtualizationcisa.gov, cisa.gov

ATT&CK techniques

Columns are ATT&CK tactics; each cell is a technique reported for this group in public sources. A technique appearing here means it has been reported for the group, not that it was used in any particular incident, and an empty cell is not evidence that the group does not use it.

Initial AccessExecutionPersistencePrivilege EscalationDefense EvasionCredential AccessDiscoveryLateral MovementCollectionExfiltrationCommand and ControlImpactResource Development
Valid AccountsWindows Management InstrumentationAccount ManipulationExploitation for Privilege EscalationObfuscated Files or InformationOS Credential DumpingSystem Service DiscoveryRemote ServicesData from Local SystemExfiltration Over Alternative ProtocolApplication Layer Protocol: Web ProtocolsData Encrypted for ImpactCompromise Accounts
Valid Accounts: Local AccountsCommand and Scripting InterpreterExternal Remote ServicesAbuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass UACObfuscated Files or Information: Embedded PayloadsOS Credential Dumping: LSASS MemoryInternet Connection DiscoveryRemote Services: Remote Desktop ProtocolExfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 ProtocolWeb Service: Bidirectional CommunicationService Stop
Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationCommand and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShellCreate AccountObfuscated Files or Information: Encrypted/Encoded FileOS Credential Dumping: NTDSRemote System DiscoveryRemote Services: SMB/Windows Admin SharesExfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Unencrypted Non-C2 ProtocolRemote Access ToolsInhibit System Recovery
Phishing: Spearphishing AttachmentCommand and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command ShellCreate Account: Local AccountMasqueradingOS Credential Dumping: /etc/passwd and /etc/shadowSystem Owner/User DiscoveryRemote Services: SSHTransfer Data to Cloud AccountSystem Shutdown/Reboot
Phishing: Spearphishing VoiceCommand and Scripting Interpreter: PythonCreate Account: Domain AccountProcess Injection: Process HollowingBrute ForceNetwork Service DiscoveryExploitation of Remote ServicesExfiltration Over Web ServiceAccount Access Removal
Exploitation for Client ExecutionBoot or Logon Autostart ExecutionIndicator RemovalBrute Force: Password SprayingProcess DiscoveryLateral Tool TransferExfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud StorageDisk Wipe: Disk Content Wipe
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderIndicator Removal: Clear Windows Event LogsCredentials from Password Stores: Password ManagersSystem Information Discovery
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Winlogon Helper DLLModify RegistryFile and Directory Discovery
Access Token ManipulationAccount Discovery
Access Token Manipulation: Token Impersonation/TheftAccount Discovery: Local Account
File and Directory Permissions Modification: Windows PermissionsAccount Discovery: Domain Account
Execution GuardrailsPeripheral Device Discovery
Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Group Policy ModificationNetwork Share Discovery
Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify ToolsDomain Trust Discovery
Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools
Hidden Artifacts
Hidden Artifacts: Hidden Window
Reflective DLL Injection

Technique details

Execution (TA0002)
  • T1047 · Windows Management Instrumentation: The ransomware deletes shadow copies using the WMIC.exe utility.
  • T1059.003 · Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell: The ransomware utilizes cmd.exe to execute various Windows utilities to implement various other techniques.
Defense Evasion (TA0005)
  • T1070.001 · Indicator Removal: Clear Windows Event Logs: The ransomware clears the victim machine's application, system, and security event logs using the wevtutil.exe utility.
  • T1562 · Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools: Threat actors use files such as: STONESTOP and POORTRY to load drivers for the purpose of disabling and deleting AV files.
Lateral Movement (TA0008)
  • T1570 · Lateral Tool Transfer: Affiliates were identified using: psexec.exe, PsExec.exe, and smbexec.exe for lateral movement.
Impact (TA0040)
  • T1486 · Data Encrypted for Impact: Files are encrypted using file replacement method.
  • T1489 · Service Stop: The Windows IIS service stop command is executed using iisreset.exe. Allows for encryption of web applications hosted on IIS servers as files linked to these applications are typically locked while IIS is running.
  • T1490 · Inhibit System Recovery: The ransomware deletes system shadow copies to inhibit system recovery.

Tools

Credential theft
  • Mimikatz
Defense evasion
  • Acronis Disk Director
  • BadRentdrv2
  • Revo Uninstaller
  • ThreatFire System Monitor driver (BYOVD)
Discovery
  • Angry IP Scanner
  • Nmap
  • SoftPerfect NetScan
  • WKTools
Exfiltration
  • FileZilla
  • PSCP
  • RClone
  • WinSCP
Living off the land
  • BITSAdmin
  • PsExec
  • WMIC
Networking and tunnelling
  • Cloudflared
  • Ngrok
  • Stowaway
Offensive tooling
  • Cobalt Strike
  • CrackMapExec
  • Impacket
  • Kerbrute
  • Metasploit
  • NetExec
  • Sliver
Remote management tools
  • AnyDesk
  • Atera
  • N-Able
  • ScreenConnect
  • Splashtop
  • TightVNC

Leak-site infrastructure

TitleTypeAddress (defanged)Seen online at snapshot
Index of /Filesransomgxjnwmu5ceqwo2jrjssxpoicolmgismfpnslaixg3pgpe5qcad[.]onionNo
Index of /Filesfpwwt67hm3mkt6hdavkfyqi42oo3vkaggvjj4kxdr2ivsbzyka5yr2qd[.]onionNo
RansomHub | HomeDLSransomxifxwc5eteopdobynonjctkxxvap77yqifu2emfbecgbqdw6qd[.]onionNo

Sources and caveats

Group descriptions, ATT&CK mappings, tools and leak-site locations come from public ransomware tracking projects, including ransomware.live and Crocodyli. Exploited vulnerabilities come from the Ransomware-Vulnerability-Matrix by BushidoUK (licensed CC BY 4.0), supplemented where a group profile there is newer than the data we hold. Each CVE links to its original research source. Technical text is shown in English as published. Leak-site addresses are defanged and shown for blocking and detection; do not visit them. Nothing here is verified by ClairSec_ against a specific incident.

Data snapshot: 2026-10-11