Overview
The group emerged in mid-February 2024 and has already listed several organizations as alleged victims of their attacks, resulting from extortion through encryption and data leaks. The announcement of the sale of the new Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) by RansomHub was published on one of the Russian-origin forums used by cybercrime to advertise malicious services, known as RAMP4U (or RAMP). A user with the nickname and persona of 'koley' announced the affiliate program on February 2, 2024. In the new RaaS announcement, it was mentioned that the money laundering operation of the paid ransoms is the responsibility of the affiliate. This means that all communication and sending of the decryptor to the victim are done through chat. The split of this RaaS would be 90% of the value for the affiliate and 10% for the developer, who in this case would be the persona of Koley. Furthermore, according to the publication, the ransomware payload is written in Golang language, uses the asymmetric algorithm based on x25519, and encryption algorithms AES256, ChaCha20, and xChaCha20, standing out for its speed. The encryption is obfuscated using AST. The payload would support network propagation and encryption of data both in secure and local mode. According to Koley, the ransomware is designed to operate on platforms such as Windows, Linux, and ESXi, as well as other architectures such as ARM and MIPS. As pointed out by the panel and already highlighted by the intelligence team, Koley stated that the panel uses a .onion domain, allowing the affiliate to organize and manage targets and chat rooms, view access logs, automatically respond when offline, and create private blog pages.
- First tracked: 2024-02-10
- Discussed in our reports: Oman · Saudi Arabia
What public reporting says
- First seen in February 2024 and widely judged to be a spin-off of the Knight ransomware (earlier Cyclops), whose source code was offered for sale. It recruited affiliates on the Russian-language RAMP forum and forbids attacks on CIS countries, Cuba, North Korea and China.
Geography: origin and targets
Assessed origin: Russian Federation. Russian-based or Russian-friendly operation: it recruits on the Russian-language RAMP forum and forbids attacks on CIS countries. Attribution is uncertain: read it as an assessment, not proof.
United States of America347
Canada35
Brazil35
United Kingdom34
Italy30
Germany24
Australia20
Spain20
India19
France18
Exploited vulnerabilities
ATT&CK techniques
Columns are ATT&CK tactics; each cell is a technique reported for this group in public sources. A technique appearing here means it has been reported for the group, not that it was used in any particular incident, and an empty cell is not evidence that the group does not use it.
Technique details
Execution (TA0002)
- T1047 · Windows Management Instrumentation: The ransomware deletes shadow copies using the WMIC.exe utility.
- T1059.003 · Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell: The ransomware utilizes cmd.exe to execute various Windows utilities to implement various other techniques.
Defense Evasion (TA0005)
- T1070.001 · Indicator Removal: Clear Windows Event Logs: The ransomware clears the victim machine's application, system, and security event logs using the wevtutil.exe utility.
- T1562 · Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools: Threat actors use files such as: STONESTOP and POORTRY to load drivers for the purpose of disabling and deleting AV files.
Lateral Movement (TA0008)
- T1570 · Lateral Tool Transfer: Affiliates were identified using: psexec.exe, PsExec.exe, and smbexec.exe for lateral movement.
Impact (TA0040)
- T1486 · Data Encrypted for Impact: Files are encrypted using file replacement method.
- T1489 · Service Stop: The Windows IIS service stop command is executed using iisreset.exe. Allows for encryption of web applications hosted on IIS servers as files linked to these applications are typically locked while IIS is running.
- T1490 · Inhibit System Recovery: The ransomware deletes system shadow copies to inhibit system recovery.
Tools
- Mimikatz
- Acronis Disk Director
- BadRentdrv2
- Revo Uninstaller
- ThreatFire System Monitor driver (BYOVD)
- Angry IP Scanner
- Nmap
- SoftPerfect NetScan
- WKTools
- FileZilla
- PSCP
- RClone
- WinSCP
- BITSAdmin
- PsExec
- WMIC
- Cloudflared
- Ngrok
- Stowaway
- Cobalt Strike
- CrackMapExec
- Impacket
- Kerbrute
- Metasploit
- NetExec
- Sliver
- AnyDesk
- Atera
- N-Able
- ScreenConnect
- Splashtop
- TightVNC
Leak-site infrastructure
| Title | Type | Address (defanged) | Seen online at snapshot |
|---|---|---|---|
| Index of / | Files | ransomgxjnwmu5ceqwo2jrjssxpoicolmgismfpnslaixg3pgpe5qcad[.]onion | No |
| Index of / | Files | fpwwt67hm3mkt6hdavkfyqi42oo3vkaggvjj4kxdr2ivsbzyka5yr2qd[.]onion | No |
| RansomHub | Home | DLS | ransomxifxwc5eteopdobynonjctkxxvap77yqifu2emfbecgbqdw6qd[.]onion | No |
Sources and caveats
Group descriptions, ATT&CK mappings, tools and leak-site locations come from public ransomware tracking projects, including ransomware.live and Crocodyli. Exploited vulnerabilities come from the Ransomware-Vulnerability-Matrix by BushidoUK (licensed CC BY 4.0), supplemented where a group profile there is newer than the data we hold. Each CVE links to its original research source. Technical text is shown in English as published. Leak-site addresses are defanged and shown for blocking and detection; do not visit them. Nothing here is verified by ClairSec_ against a specific incident.
Data snapshot: 2026-10-11