Zero Trust: Kill The Perimeter

The "Castle and Moat" model is dead. It's been dead since the first VPN credential got phished. Yet, I still see enterprises acting like their internal network is a sanctuary. Newsflash: The call is coming from inside the house.

Paranoia as a Service

Zero Trust isn't a product you buy from a vendor. It's a mindset. It's the professional paranoia that assumes the attacker is already on the endpoint, already in the Kubernetes cluster, already reading the Slack channels.

The core axiom is simple: Verify Explicitly. ID is the new perimeter. If you're trusting traffic just because it's on VLAN 10, you're doing it wrong.

How We Break "Trusted" Networks

When we engage in a Red Team op, the internal network is our playground. Why?

Flat Networks: Once we pop one dev box, we can pivot to the prod DB because there's no segmentation.
Implicit Trust: "Oh, that API endpoint doesn't need auth, it's internal only." Famous last words.
Permissive IAM: Why does the Jenkins service account have AdministratorAccess?

The Clairsec Fix

We help organization move from "Implicit Trust" to "Assumed Breach."

Micro-segmentation: Break the network into tiny, isolated shards. If a container gets popped, the blast radius is zero.
Identity Aware Proxy: Put every internal app behind strict OAuth. No more VPNs for web apps.
Continuous Auth: Context-aware access. Logging in from a new country at 3 AM? MFA challenge.

Stop Trusting. Start Verifying.

Zero Trust is hard. It breaks workflows. It annoys developers. But the alternative is explaining to your shareholders why the entire customer database is on a dark web forum.

Trust nothing. Verify everything.